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TITLE VII COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIMS:
ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY, PROOF,
DEFENSES, AND REMEDIES FOR
SEX-BASED WAGE
DISCRIMINATION*
This Comment analyzes a new title VII claim of sex-based
wage discrimination which requires a remedy for women or men
based on the comparable worth of distinct work. Until recently,
primarily women have been denied the full benefit of title VII pro-
tection because of judicial decisions, limiting compensation
claims to equal work situations. Now, women suffering discrimi-
nation in unique work positions or in female-dominated work
may find relief. Nevertheless, controversy continues over the the-
ory for such a cause of action, the burden of proof, employer de-
fenses, and remedies. This Comment examines these important
issues which affect the future wage status of women workers and
employer pay practices.
INTRODUCTION
Wage disparity between male and female workers is common-
place in the American civilian labor force.' A gap in earnings be-
tween the sexes adversely affects thirty-seven million women
workers, the majority of whom need to work because of some eco-
nomic necessity.2 A contributing factor to the wage differential
* The author thanks Sister Sally Furay, law professor and Provost of the
University of San Diego, and Martin Steele for their invaluable help in the
preparation of this Comment.
1. Comparing the annual median income in 1977 of year-round full-time work-
ers by sex, the women's income was 58.5% of the men's income. WOMEN'S Bu-
REAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 19, 1-5
(1979) (source for statistics: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Cur-
rent Population Reports, p. 60, No. 118). "The 15 million females living in poverty
(in 1975) accounted for 3 out of 5 persons (58 percent) who were poor in the
United States .... About one-third of all families headed by women were poor-
more than five times the 5.6% rate for male-head families." WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN WrrH LOW INCOMES 1-6 (1977).
2. Women workers comprise two-fifths of the civilian labor force in the
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between men and women is discriminatory behavior of employ-
ers.3 This problem was recognized and addressed by two congres-
sional acts.4
In 1963, the Congress, with heightened awareness of the ad-
verse impact of sex discrimination in employment, enacted the
Equal Pay Act (EPA).5 This Act requires employers to pay em-
United States. The proffle of the average woman worker today is the 35 year old
woman found in any of a great number of occupations. WOMEN'S BUREAU, EM-
PLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN WORKERS To-
DAY 1 (1976). Women are employed for the same reasons as most men-to provide
for the welfare of themselves, their families or others. In a recent government re-
port, WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF
WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979), women workers are described in detail:
Over 40 percent of the women in the labor force in 1978 had never married,
or were widowed, divorced, or separated. Most of the 10.2 million women
workers who were never married were working to support themselves,
and some had to support others as well. Nearly all of the 8.0 million wo-
men workers who were widowed, divorced or separated from their hus-
bands-particularly the women with children-were working for
compelling economic reasons. In addition, the 4.1 million married women
workers whose husbands had incomes below $7,000 in 1977 almost cer-
tainly worked because of economic need. Finally, about 3.1 million women
would be added if we take into account those women whose husbands had
incomes between $7,000 and $10,000. In all, nearly two-thirds of the women
in the labor force in 1978 worked to support themselves and their families,
or to supplement low family incomes. Of course, all working women con-
tribute to the well-being of themselves and their families.
Id. This modern reality contradicts outdated assumptions about women's reasons
to work. See, e.g., N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 5-7 (1971), for
a description of the "family life cycle" which allegedly applies to 94% of the popu-
lation. Three faulty premises are used to support this claim: 94% of the popula-
tion is living in an economic "household"; households are synonymous with
traditional families, comprised of a husband, wife, and children; and a working
wife's primary purpose in life is to raise the children at home. Therefore, working
wives presumably depict all working women, and their reasons for working are in-
cidental compared to working men. Id. at 7-8.
3. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN
WOMEN AND MEN 1-5 (1979). See also F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS, JR., LA-
BOR EcoNomics 510 (1980). Women are often employed in a few occupations
which are dominated by females and which pay lower wages than similar jobs oc-
cupied by males. Discrimination by sex is one factor believed to contribute to this
job segregation and wage disparity. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
20 FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS 3 (1979) (source for statistics: U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census; U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Na-
tional Center for Social Statistics; U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
and Employment and Training Administration) (women occupy 80% of all clerical
positions, 63% of service positions, and 64% of retail positions). See also WOMEN'S
BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN WORKERS TODAY 7-8 (1976) (women account
for 72% of teachers and 64% of all health workers) and Blumrosen, Wage Discrimi-
nation, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH.
J.L. 397 (1979) (reviewed the relationship of job segregation and wage dis-
crimination).
4. See notes 30-42 and accompanying text infra.
5. The Equal Pay Act (EPA) provides in part:
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to em-
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ployees equal wages for identical or substantially equal work, re-
gardless of sex.6 Male and female workers, however, are rarely
employed in substantially equal work conditions.7 As a result,
this congressional mandate does not apply to a majority of com-
mon situations involving sex-based wage inequities.
In 1964, title VII of the Civil Rights Act 8 was passed as a broad
prohibition against employment discrimination based on sex.
Under title VII claims of sex-based wage discrimination theoreti-
cally could have been allowed but were in fact limited by the
courts to the narrow scope of the EPA equal work standard.9 The
effect of requiring the equal work standard for a title VII claim
was to make most forms of sex-based wage discrimination lawful.
In 1980, circuit courts divided over whether to recognize wage
discrimination claims under title VII that went beyond the scope
ployees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differen-
tial in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
Equal Pay Act, Pub. I No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1) (1976)). The EPA was "to remedy what was perceived to be a serious
and endemic problem of [sex-based] employment discrimination in private indus-
try." Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
6. Id The equal work standard required "substantially equal" rather than
identical work, following Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
7. '"The sole consistent result of the melange of empirical studies surveyed is
that sex discrimination in the form of unequal pay for equal work is of little, if
any, quantitative significance." Kahne & Kohen, Economic Perspectives on the Role
of Women in the American Economy, 13 J. ECON. Lrr. 1249, 1261 (1975).
8. Title VII provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin; ... (2) to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
9. See notes 65-69 and accompanying text infra.
of the EPA.1o Then in 1981, the Supreme Court for the first time
recognized such a claim." Claims beyond the EPA standard in-
volve the "comparable worth" of jobs rather than "equal work."12
If a comparable worth claim is to be recognized by modern courts,
major issues must be resolved concerning the claim's theory, bur-
den of proof, defenses, and remedies under title VII.
Vigorous opposition to the comparable worth claim has arisen
at every stage of a title VII suit against a major employer.' 3 Some
large corporations, which depend upon a nonlitigious female work
force, are threatened by a comparable worth challenge to their ec-
onomic status quo.14 Major changes in female compensation are
inevitable if title VII's prohibition of sex-based wage discrimina-
tion is applied to comparable worth type wage inequities, and the
remedies will have far-reaching significance for millions of women
workers and industrial pay practices.' 5 This Comment discusses
the major issues surrounding a comparable worth claim under ti-
tle VII and serves as a guide to understanding the comparable
worth theory.
COMPARABLE WORTH DEFINITION
The theory underlying a comparable worth claim under title VII
should be carefully defined. Otherwise, the application of a vague
theory to a wide variety of wage situations easily leads to confu-
sion, with opponents characterizing the comparable worth theory
as rubric.16 Comparable worth is a relatively simple concept, cre-
10. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers (IUE) v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Gunther v. County of Wash., 623
F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 352 (1980); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin
Stockade, 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980). Contra, Lemons v. City of Denver, 17 F.E.P.
Cases 906 (D. CoL 1978), affid, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
244 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
11. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (1981).
12. See cases cited in notes 10-11 supra. For a definition and examples of com-
parable worth, see notes 16-28 and accompanying text infra. A common, alterna-
tive phrase to "comparable worth" is "equal pay for comparable work." But
"comparable work" is narrower than "work of comparable worth or value" and is
easily confused with a rejected formula for strict liability, see notes 43-47 and ac-
companying text infra.
13. See, e.g., Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Compara-
ble Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MCH. J. 231, 234 n.5 (1980); Kahn, Compa-
rable Worth: Journey of a Thousand Miles, 3 CORP. L. REV. 136 (1980).
14. See, e.g., R. LrVERNASH, CO~MRABLE WORTH: IssuEs AND ALTERNATrvES 1
(1980).
15. See, e.g., BusNEss WEEK 42 (Sept. 8, 1980), and notes 162-76 and accompa-
nying text infra for a discussion of remedies.
16. Cf. Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 397 (discussing the remedy of comparing
job values); Nelson, supra note 13, at 234 n.5 (the label "comparable worth theory"
was applied to the comparable worth idea as well as being used as a synonym for
the equal work idea (I) and was characterized as "proportionate worth theory");
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ated as a necessary counterpart to the equal pay for equal work
formula of the EPA.17
The equal pay for equal work formula is applied when a male's
job and a female's job are identical or substantially equal in fnc-
tion.18 If the two jobs are "equal," then the pay must be equal.19
Therefore, the equal work formula is useful in two ways: to deter-
mine illegal discrimination (by direct comparison of jobs); and to
provide a remedy (by requiring the pay of the two jobs to be
equal).20
The modern function of the comparable worth standard under
title VII is to provide flexibility by permitting review of discrimi-
natory wage practices which do not have an equal work compari-
son. "Comparable worth" derives its name from the prescribed
remedy for illegal wage discrimination: the determination of a
fair wage by someone's job evaluation and by the comparison of
different jobs' worths.21 Contrary to the dual function of the
equal work formula, comparable worth does not require compari-
son of the comparable worths of different jobs in order to deter-
mine liability under title VII.
A danger to avoid in defining comparable worth is the assump-
tion that "comparable work"22 is a substitute for "equal work" in
the EPA's equal pay for equal work formula. The two standards
serve two Acts which differ in substance and scope of liability.
Kahn, supra note 13, at 136 (comparable worth described as rubric); R. LIVERNASH,
COMPARABLE WoRTH: IssuEs AND ALTERNATiVES 1 (1980) (no definition exists).
17. See note 5 supra. The criteria for equal work include "the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2) (1976).
18. The criterion of equal work was broadened to substantially equal work in
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970).
19. See 109 CONG. REC. 8914 (1963) (remarks of Senator McNamara, the chair-
man of the Senate Labor Subcommittee). Senator McNamara described the EPA
as he introduced it on the Senate floor, as follows:
As we all know, the Fair Labor Standards Act provides that workers must
be paid a decent minimum wage; that if employees must put in long
hours, they must be paid at an overtime rate; and that children may only
be employed under rigid conditions which protect their health and safety.
The bill I now introduce would add one additional fair labor standard to
the act; namely, that employees doing equal work should be paid equal
wages, regardless of sex.
109 CONG. REc. 7294 (1963).
20. See note 19 supra.
21. For a discussion of who should evaluate job worth, see notes 163-77 infra.
22. For the historical background of this term, see notes 32-35 infra.
The EPA was devised to impose liability upon an employer who
unequally paid employees for equal work, based on sex.23 In con-
trast, title VII was enacted as the first broad prohibition against
all types of employment discrimination, including hiring, termina-
tion, promotion, and status, as well as compensation.24 Under ti-
tle VII, a violation may occur when an employee's wage is
adversely affected by any form of an employer's discriminatory
practice or pattern of compensation, based on the employee's gen-
der. No simple formula can cover every comparable worth claim
which is possible under title VII and which requires evaluation of
job worth for a remedy. Therefore, a comparable worth claim
does not have the limited scope of the EPA standard, and the
claim is not the equivalent of a "comparable work" formula.
An example of a comparable worth situation would be a female
employed in a unique job position, and no equal position is held
by a male.25 A comparable worth claimant would state that she
was paid less than a man would have received in that job position
solely because of unlawful sex discrimination. A violation under
title VII would be demonstrated by testimony about the wage his-
tory of predecessors in that job, by disparate impact of company
policy upon females and males, or by some type of discriminatory
plan which worked against females.26 To remedy the injustice,
the court cannot turn to an equal work position filled by a man
because such a position does not exist. The remedy must be fash-
ioned based upon an evaluation of the job's comparable worth.
Another comparable worth situation involves a company policy
or practice which segregates female workers from male workers
and reduces the pay of jobs dominated by the females. 27 This
23. For the text and a description of the EPA, see notes 5 & 8 supra. Also, the
EPA coverage is limited to those employers subject to the Fair Labor Standards
Act. S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963). Thus, as the Supreme Court
distinguished the EPA from title VII, "the [EPA] does not apply, for example, to
certain businesses engaged in retail sales, fishing, agriculture, and newspaper pub-
lishing." See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(s), 213(a) (1976); County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49
U.S.L.W. 4623, 4625 (1981).
24. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
25. If title VII claims had to satisfy the "equal work" standard of the EPA, the
woman being underpaid in a unique job position would obtain no relief. See
County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4628 (1981); Rinkel v. Associated
Pipeline Contractors, 17 F.E.P. Cases 224, 226 (D. Alas. 1978).
26. See, e.g., notes 95-99 and accompanying text infra. In some circumstances,
different jobs' wages may be directly compared to the jobs' equal worth to the em-
ployer. Liability may be rebuttably presumed from a pay inequity caused by dis-
crimination. However, a "comparable worth formula" for liability like the EPA
formula could again be used by the courts to exclude non-conforming, wage dis-
crimination claims under title VIL For this reason, a comparable worth standard
needs to be as inclusive as title VII itself.
27. See IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir. 1980).
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type of policy was once openly practiced by some employers. 28
Today this policy can continue through subtle variations such as
job segregation, exploitation of a controlled supply of female
workers, and manipulation of wages based on sex. The equal
work formula of the EPA would deny a cause of action for any of
these sex-based wage differentials, because equal work between
the sexes is absent. Thus, a comparable worth standard is neces-
sary for judicial review of all bona fide claims of sex-based wage
discrimination under title VII.
VALIDITY OF A COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIM: UNLAWFUL SEX-
BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION
If comparable worth claims are to be validated, support must be
drawn from the construction of title VII and Congress' intention
to prohibit all sex-based wage discrimination. Arguments op-
posed to comparable worth claims raise two issues. First, did
Congress seriously intend to prohibit sex discrimination, or was
the sex classification in title VII insignificant; and second, did
Congress intend the scope of title VII to include comparable
worth claims, or was the EPA standard Congress' final word on
sex-based wage discrimination? This section analyzes the rele-
vant factors in an attempt to determine Congress' intent.
Statutory Authority
All inquiries involving statutory construction should begin with
the language of the statute.29 Title VII prohibits employment dis-
crimination "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex
28. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 402-21; Kahne & Kohen, Economic
Perspectives on the Role of Women in the American Economy, 13 J. ECON. Lrr. 1249
(1975); WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPr. OF LABOR, WOEN WoRKERs TODAY (1976).
Before 1963, sex-based wage discrimination was lawful and overtly practiced. For
example:
General Electric (GE) used a job evaluation manual which provided for
evaluating jobs by assessing points for skill, effort, responsibility, and
working conditions without regard to sex. When it came to pricing the job
on the basis of points assessed, however, the manual specified, "[f] or fe-
male operators the value shall be two-thirds the value for the adult male
worker." This one-third discount meant that all but a small fraction of the
women's jobs were rated substantially below male common labor despite
the fact that many, if not most, of these jobs clearly involved more skill,
mental aptitude, and responsibility than the male common labor jobs.
Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 425 (quoting General Elec. and Westinghouse Elec.
Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666, 683 (1945)).
29. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980).
or national origin ... .,,30 The plain language of title VII seems to
indicate that Congress intended to treat these various classifica-
tions equally. Nevertheless, an argument has been made that
Congress implicitly excepted sex from title VII's strong prohibi-
tion because of the unique legislative histories of the EPA and ti-
tle VII.31
In 1963, one year prior to the passage of title VII the EPA was
enacted by the Eighty-eighth Congress, culminating eighteen
years of legislative study of sex-based wage inequities.32 Con-
gress rejected a "comparable work" formula for strict liability
under the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended by the EPA. The
debate in 1963, however, revealed that some legislators believed
that "equal work" was a broader term than "comparable work."33
Also, inconsisent applications of a "comparable work" standard
by the National War Labor Board had caused great confusion,34
and some legislators feared that strict liability would be imposed
on an employer on a vague and subjective basis. 35
Then, in 1964, title VII was enacted by the same Eighty-eighth
Congress. 36 Only one day before approval of title VII, the word
"sex" was added to the bill on the House floor, without prior hear-
ings.37 Thus, very little information is available about Congress'
intent.38
Critics have attacked the application of title VII to comparable
worth claims because of Congress' "cursory treatment" of the
"sex" amendment.39 If the amendment had been adopted in a
vacuum of time and thought, then the best conclusion about Con-
gress' intent would be that we don't know. In fact, the Eighty-
eighth Congress had only recently drawn upon tremendous quan-
tities of information concerning sex discrimination in order to en-
act the EPA.4o Whereas the EPA was "one of the first steps
toward an adjustment of balance in pay for women,"41 the amend-
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
31. Nelson, supra note 13, at 167-70.
32. See Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential
Protections Under Title VII, 8 Loy. Cm. LJ. 723, 734-42 (1977).
33. Id. at 739-42.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 742-49.
37. Id.
38. General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976). See Gitt, supra note 32, at
742-49. Supporters for the amendment carried the vote (168 to 133), 110 CONG. REC.
2584 (1964), and also voted for title VIIs passage (290 to 130) only two days later,
110 CONG. REC. 2904 (1964).
39. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 13, at 267-70.
40. See Gitt, supra note 32, at 736-39, 744.
41. 109 CONG. REC. 9193 (1963) (Remarks of Rep. Bolton). The EPA was con-
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ment of title VII to include sex, and its subsequent passage, can
be viewed as an attempt during a period of heightened awareness
and momentum to prohibit all discrimination in employment. 42
Thus, arguments can be made on both sides because lack of legis-
lative history for the "sex" amendment leaves intent open to
interpretation.
Another argument attempts to diminish the significance of the
sex classification in title VII compared to those classifications
based on race, color, religion, and national origin. The congres-
sional rejection of a "comparable work" standard for the EPA has
been construed to imply a congressional intent to reject modern
"comparable worth" claims.43 In addition, the claim is made that
Congress implicitly promised the business community that no
subsequent act would interfere with wages between the sexes un-
less the jobs were equal.44
The mixed EPA history of legislative intent does not support or
sidered by many congressional members to be only a first step toward a broad
prohibition. See 109 CONG. REc. 9205 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan); id. at 9193
(remarks of Rep. St. George); id. at 9195 (remarks of Rep. Fielenghuysen); id. at
9196 (remarks of Rep. Thompson); id. at 9204 (remarks of Rep. Toll). See Diehl,
Civil Rights: Relationship of Title VII & the Equal Pay Act-New Muscle for the
Struggle Against Sex Discrimination, 19 WAsHBuRN L.J. 554, 556 (1980).
42. The mood of the Country and the Congress was influenced by several
events in 1963, as cited in Brief for Appellants, (IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980)), at 17 n.12:
The growing national commitment to civil rights was influenced as well as
demonstrated by the civil rights protests in the summer and fall of 1963.
Most dramatic was the March for Jobs and Freedom at which 200,000 peo-
ple assembled before the Lincoln Memorial and heard Dr. Martin Luther
King give his historic "I Have a Dream" speech. Reprinted at 109 Cong.
Rec. 16229 (Sept. 3, 1963). The assassination of President Kennedy in No-
vember added further momentum to growing support for civil rights legis-
lation. The civil rights bill was introduced at the behest of President
Kennedy in June, 1963, 109 Cong. Rec. 1157, but received insufficient sup-
port in the Congress. President Johnson, in his first address before a joint
session of Congress on November 27, 1963, stated:
No memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President
Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil
rights bill for which he fought so long. We have talked long enough in
this country about equal rights. We have talked for one hundred
years or more. It is time to write the next chapter, and to write it in
the books of law.
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1 Bup. Papers 8 (1965).
Contra, Judge Rehnquist in his dissent in County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W.
4623, 4631 (1981) believed that title VII "passed with virtually no consideration of
the specific problem of sex-based wage discrimination."
43. E.g., Nelson, supra note 13, at 269-70.
44. See id.; County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4634 (1981) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
refute these speculations. Because comparable work is distin-
guishable from modern comparable worth theory, the congres-
sional action with the EPA does not seem applicable to a title VII
comparable worth claim. In United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,45 the Supreme Court acknowledged the influence of the
business community in the passage of title VII, for "Title VII
could not have been enacted into law without substantial support
from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal
regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a
price for support that 'management prerogatives and union free-
doms ... be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.' "4
The Court, in quoting Senator Humphrey, however, also noted
that the EPA was triggered by a Nation's concern over discrimi-
nation and was intended to aid its victims. It would be ironic if
the EPA were to lead to the contraction, under title VII, of the
rights of the very victims meant to be protected.47
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. ,48 the Supreme Court
apparently regarded all bases of discrimination as equally prohib-
ited.49 In the absence of statutory language which excludes sex
from title VI's prohibition or a Supreme Court interpretation to
the contrary, there is little reason to conclude that Congress in-
tended to allow discriminatory behavior on the basis of sex which
would be prohibited if done on the basis of race, religion, or na-
tional origin.50
45. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
46. Id. at 206.
47. Id. at 204.
48. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
49. The Court stated:
We begin by repeating the observation of earlier decisions that in enacting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit all
practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment oppor-
tunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national
origin,... and ordained that its policy of outlawing such discriminations
should have the "highest priority"....
Id. at 763 (citations omitted). Also, in Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978), the Court stated:
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an employer could fash-
ion his personnel policies on the basis of assumptions about the differ-
ences between men and women, whether or not the assumptions were
valid. It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be pre-
dicted on mere "stereo-typed" impressions about the characteristics of
males or females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a wo-
man's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable
reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them
less.
50. "We must therefore avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims
of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate." County of
Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4628 (1981). See also IUE v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980).
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The second major issue is whether Congress intended to limit
the scope of title VII's coverage of sex-based compensation claims
to the narrow reach of the EPA's equal pay for equal work stan-
dard. This issue arises from the equivocal language and history of
the Bennett Amendment. 51 This amendment was attached to title
VII and stated that differentiations "authorized" by the EPA are
not unlawful under title VII.52 The plain language of the Bennett
Amendment seems to indicate that title VII is diluted only to the
extent that it incorporates the four exceptions of wage differen-
tials permitted by the EPA.53 Because of its unusual wording and
brevity, however, the possibility of an alternative construction
exists.
A narrow interpretation of the Bennett Amendment is that any
behavior not addressed by the Equal Pay Act is not unlawful
under title VII.54 In effect, title VII and the EPA would be coex-
tensive, and any compensation claim under title VII would be
governed by the EPA equal work standard or invalidated.5 5 Be-
cause the language of the amendment does not easily yield this
narrow construction, legislative history is debated to support this
interpretation.
When Senator Bennett introduced his amendment to the Sen-
51. The Bennett Amendment states in part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter
for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the
amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of
such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of
[the EPA].
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976)) (Emphasis added). See,
e.g., Note, The Bennett Amendment-Title VII and Gender-Based Discrimi.
nation, 68 GEo. L.J. 1169, 1169-90 (1980).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
53. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4625 (1981); UE v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir. 1980). Both courts referred to dic-
tionary definitions of the word "authorize" which connotes an affirmative enabling
action. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 122 (5th ed. 1979) defines "authorize" as "[to]
empower; to give a right or authority to act." As the Supreme Court reasoned, the
EPA's definition of a violation (the equal work standard) "can hardly be said to
'authorize' anything at all: it is purely prohibitive." On the other hand, the four
exceptions "in essence 'authorize' employers to differentiate in pay on the basis of
seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or any other factor other than
sex.... It is to these provisions, therefore, that the Bennett Amendment must
refer." County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4625 (1981). See also Blum-
rosen, supra note 3, at 482-83.
54. See, e.g., Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971); notes 65-69 infra.
55. Id.
ate, he explained: "The purpose of my amendment is to provide
that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act
shall not be nullified. I understand that the leadership in charge
of the bill [has] agreed to the amendment as a proper technical
correction of the bil."56 Senator Dirksen responded that the
pending amendment only recognized the EPA exceptions and car-
ried them into the basic act.5 7 The amendment passed on the ba-
sis of these explanations to the congressional body.58
Representative Celler explained to the House certain changes
made by the Senate, including the Bennett Amendment. He said:
"[The Senate amendment] [p]rovides that compliance with the
Fair Labor Standards Act as amended, satisfies the requirement
of the title barring discrimination because of sex-section
56. The complete history of the Bennett Amendment is set forth below:
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes...
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 44, line 15, immediately after the period, it is proposed to insert
the following new sentence: "It shall not be an unlawful employment
practice under this title for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of
sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be
paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized
by the provisions of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
as amended (19 U.S.C. 206(d))."
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of yearning by mem-
bers of the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the ap-
propriate committees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called
Equal Pay Act, which became effective only yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the effective adminis-
tration of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration,
in which the word 'sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe
sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the
wholesale insertion of the word 'sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act.
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of con-
flicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified.
I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the
amendment as a proper technical correction of the bill. If they will con-
firm that understand [sic], I shall ask that the amendment be voted on
without asking for the yeas and nays.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful.
I believe it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amend-
ment is fully acceptable.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. We were aware
of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay Act was an
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards
Act carried out certain exceptions.
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions,
that are carried in the basic act. Therefore, this amendment is necessary,
in the interest of clarification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. RIBICOFF in the chair). The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Utah. (Putting
the question)
The amendment was agreed to.
110 CONG. REc. 13647 (1964).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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703(b)."59 This might mean that title VII was no broader than the
EPA. But title VII proscribes a broad range of gender-based dis-
crimination which is not barred by the EPA, such as discrimina-
tory promotions, transfers, and firing. A plausible construction of
Celler's remark is that compliance with the EPA met the title
VII's requirement on equal work issues alone.60
Considering these remarks and the quick handling of the "tech-
nical correction" by Congress, the Supreme Court concluded,
"only differentials attributable to the four affirmative defenses of
the Equal Pay Act are 'authorized' by that Act within the mean-
ing of... [the Bennett Amendment]. "61 Comparable worth op-
ponents refute this conclusion by citing Congressional
memoranda which were submitted to Congress two months
before and one year after the amendment was introduced. 62
These statements, however, do not indicate the intent of Congress
when the amendment was passed and should be accorded little, if
any, weight.63
The language of title VII and the legislative histories of the
EPA, title VII, and the Bennett Amendment seem to indicate a
harmonious relationship between title VII and the EPA, whereby
59. 110 CONG. REC. 15896 (1964).
60. "If taken literally, . .. not only would it confine wage discrimination
claims to those actionable under the Equal Pay Act, but it would block all other
sex discrimination claims as well. We can only conclude that Representative Cel-
ler's explanation was not intended to be precise. . . ." County of Wash. v. Gun-
ther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4627 (1981). See also IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631
F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir. 1980).
61. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.LW. 4623, 4626 (1981).
62. Two months before the Bennett Amendment was introduced, Senator
Clark introduced into the Congressional Record a memorandum which contained
the statement: "The standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimina-
tion as to wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable situation under title
VII." 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark). This could mean ei-
ther that title VII is constrained by the EPA or that the EPA is controlling in
equal work challenges under title VII, and the comment does not prove later in-
tent. The only purpose served by this record is to suggest some interest of Con-
gress in the interrelationship of the two acts.
One year after the amendment was introduced, Senator Bennett described his
intention for the amendment in a memorandum. 111 CONG. REC. 13359 (1965).
However, this later view does not reveal the intention of Congress at the time of
the passage.
63. The Supreme Court has warned, "[t]he views of the members of a later
Congress, concerning different sections of title VIA enacted after this litigation
was commenced, are entitled to little if any weight." International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977); IUE v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 631 F.2d at 1103, 1104 (3d Cir. 1980).
the limited EPA applies to equal work claims and broader title
VII coverage includes all other claims of discrimination in
compensation. 64
Case Authority
In the past, some courts have assumed without analysis that
the Bennett Amendment restricted the scope of sex-based wage
discrimination cases under title VII to the scope of the EPA.65 If
a claim did not involve equal work, the courts dismissed it and ig-
nored the comparable worth issue.66 In an early EPA case, the
court commented that the Bennett Amendment mandated the
construction of title VII in pari mateia with EPA, although a
method of harmonizing the statutes was not suggested.67 Then in
deciding EPA claims involving equal work, two circuit courts
went beyond the issues presented to them and mandated a re-
quirement of equal work to establish any wage discrimination
claim under title VII.68 Later, relying on this precedent, most
courts which heard EPA claims summarily dismissed the ques-
tion of title VII coverage of a claim where substantially equal
work was not proven.69 Recently in contrast, some courts have
accepted compensation claims under title VII which could not be
brought under the EPA; and in each case, some type of compara-
64. See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4625-29 (1981); IUE v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stock-
ade, 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
65. E.g., Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Orr v. MacNeill and
Sons, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v.
Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1977).
66. See cases cited in note 65 supra.
67. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970). The doctrine of in pari mateia specifies that "Where there is no
clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a
general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." Radzanower v. Touche Ross
& Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974)).
Recently, this doctrine was again applied to title VII through the Bennett
Amendment by the argument that the more specific EPA should control claims of
sex-based wage discrimination brought under the general title VIL County of
Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4631 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
doctrine is inapposite to the two Acts, however, because the more specific EPA is
not being controlled or nullified by an application of title VII. Title VII simply al-
lows different claims to arise than are possible under the EPA's narrow coverage.
Justice Rehnquist's application of the doctrine is arguably possible only if the
EPA was enacted in order to limit the relief available to employees suffering wage
discrimination because of their sex. This supposed intent is contrary to the over-
all purpose of the EPA. See notes 5, 19 and 23 supra.
68. Orr v. MacNeill and Sons, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
69. See, e.g., Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); In
re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249 (D.C. Fla. 1977); Howard v. Ward County,
North Dakota, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.C.N.D. 1976).
[voL. 18: 685 1981] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ble worth evaluation was necessary.7o
These various judicial decisions can be characterized by their
utilization of two, alternative approaches to comparable worth-
type claims. Under the first approach, the court first examines
the remedy being sought by the plaintiff. If the imposition of this
remedy is too burdensome on the court, no right or liability is
found. Conversely, if the remedy is not perceived as too difficult
for the court to fashion, the plaintiff's right and employer's liabil-
ity are reviewed. The second approach taken by some courts is to
apply the relevant statutory and case authorities to the facts of
the case. If the employer violated title VII, then a remedy is fash-
ioned in accord with the circumstances.
The first approach emphasizes the institutional and economic
consequences of a remedy which adjusts wages. While one court
may have no difficulty mandating a job evaluation plan to correct
unlawful wage disparities affecting a large class of employees, an-
other court may balk at the magnitude of the wage adjustment
and instead prefer to fashion a remedy only for an individual
plaintiff. Varying degrees of expertise and preference among the
courts create uncertainty about the validity of a comparable
worth claim.
For example, in Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors,71 the
Ninth Circuit permitted a comparable worth claim when an indi-
vidual plaintiff sought relief from discrimination in her unique job
position. The remedy involved only evaluation of one job's worth.
On the other hand, in the complex job segregation case of Chris-
tensen v. Iowa,7 2 the court focused on the burden of fashioning a
70. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (1981); UE v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors,
17 F.E.P. Cases 224 (D. Alas. 1978); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 624 F.2d 945
(10th Cir. 1980).
71. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1980).
72. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). In a class action, female clerical employees at
a state university alleged illegal sex discrimination in compensation under title
VII. The university instituted a pay scheme, known as the Hayes System, under
which compensation was to be based on an objective evaluation of each job's rela-
tive worth to the employer regardless of the market price. The system was
designed to establish "internal equity" among university jobs. However, because
the local job market paid higher wages for physical plant jobs than the beginning
pay under the school system, the university paid the physical plant employees,
mostly men, more than the clerical employees, all females, despite equivalent sen-
iority and jobs in the same labor grade. Plaintiffs argued that long-standing dis-
criminatory practices in the local job market, which channeled women workers
into a small number of jobs, resulted in an over-supply of workers and depressed
remedy which would adjust the wages of a class of employees and
affect the local market rate for labor. The court believed there
was no need to resolve the conflict over the Bennett Amendment,
EPA, and title VII.73 The plaintiffs failed to establish their case
because they had ignored "economic realities."74
Basing a decision upon the economic impact of a proposed rem-
edy has lead to contradictions within the same court. In March,
1980, the Tenth Circuit in Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade S was
confronted with proof of an employer's discriminatory practice
against an individual employee.7 6 Plaintiff conceded that she did
not perform the same work as her predecessor but asserted a title
VII claim. The court found the discriminatory wage behavior to
be a violation of title VIIH; and because plaintiff was no longer an
employee of the defendant, the remedy did not involve any ad-
justment of her present wage.7 7 One month later in Lemons v.
City of Denver,7 8 the Tenth Circuit decided that the plaintiffs'
rights to challenge wage discrimination in a job segregation claim
were curtailed by the remedial problems perceived by both dis-
trict and circuit courts. With protest of "Big Brother" and incred-
ulous reference to congressional intent, the district court refused
to take on the task of changing the City's reliance on low market
rates for the wages of nurses.7 9 Contradictions within the same
wages in those jobs. The district court rejected plaintiffs' claim and the court of
appeals held that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of illegal sex dis-
crimination in compensation, solely because higher wages were paid to one but
not another job of equal value to the employer. See the discussion of the labor
market competition arguments at notes 136-54 and text accompanying infra and
statutory exemptions at notes 129-35 and text accompanying infra.
73. Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d at 355.
74. Id. at 356.
75. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
76. Id. Plaintiff was an employee of Sirloin Stockade. She showed a history of
being denied pay equal to that of a predecessor. Her opportunity for advancement
was denied, and the company retaliated against her when she fied a complaint in
the state office. She left that position, and a return to employment at Sirloin
Stockade was not possible because of the hostility directed toward her.
77. Id. "Here a finding of discrimination under Title VII does not conflict with
the provisions of the Equal Pay Act. It was found that the plaintiff was discrimi-
nated against solely because of her sex in a manner which is not within the scope
of the Equal Pay Act." Id. at 953 n.2.
78. 17 F.E.P. Cases 906 (D. CoL 1978), affd, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980). Plaintiffs were in the nursing profession (female
dominated) and contended that the City was illegally discriminating by paying
nurses at their market rate, which was less than what comparable work in the
male-dominated occupations earned. Plaintiffs showed a history of being un-
derpaid by the City's reliance on the labor market scale.
79. The judge said in an oral opinion:
I think that to structure the classification system in the way plaintiffs seek
to structure it would be unrealistic .... If we are to have, in this country,
the legendary 1984 as expressed in the book, the Big Brother looking over
our shoulder who is going to dictate our day-to-day ways of life, it's going
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court are possible under the first approach, where the validity of
each comparable worth claim depends on the court's informal
preliminary judgment of the difficulty of fashioning a remedy.
On the other hand, the second approach has been to consist-
ently apply title VII to each case. For example, in 1980, the Ninth
Circuit was the first court to inquire into the statutory construc-
tion for a claim of discrimination by job segregation of the
sexes.80 Later in the same year, the Third Circuit held in favor of
a plaintiff's class action for sex-based wage discrimination under
title VII after analyzing the relationship between title VII, the
Bennett Amendment, and the EPA.81 Then in 1981, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision, based on statutory
construction of the Acts.82
In County of Washington v. Gunther,83 four female matrons of a
prison sued to recover compensation equivalent to that of the
male guards in the prison. Plaintiffs contended that the County
"evaluated the worth of their jobs; that the County determined
that they should be paid approximately ninety-five percent as
much as the male correctional officers; that it paid them only sev-
enty percent as much, while paying the male officers the full eval-
uated worth of their jobs . . . "; and that a history of intentional
sex-based discriminatory wage practice resulted in an unlawful
wage disparity under title VH.84 The district court rejected plain-
tiffs' alternative claim of equal work as insufficient to meet the
standard of the EPA, and the court dismissed the case without
considering the title VII argument. The court of appeals reversed
this decision on the ground that a theory might exist which could
establish a violation of title VII based on wage discrimination.8 5
to have to come from the Congress. It's not going to come at least from
this Court
Id. at 914. The courts were persuaded by some of the labor market competition
arguments, discussed in notes 136-54 and accompanying text infra.
80. Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980).
82. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (1981).
83. Id. Four women, formerly jail matrons, challenged the dislarate pay be-
tween the matrons and male guards, and their firing in retaliation for demanding
equal pay under title VII. Matrons guarded female prisoners and performed some
clerical work. Male guards guarded male prisoners in another section of the
prison.
84. Id. at 4628. A comparable worth theory per se was not argued, although
the claim required a comparable worth remedy. Id. at 4624-25.
85. Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303, 1311 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs
failed to prove equal work because the matrons performed some clerical work in
To allow dismissal, the court reasoned, would insulate certain dis-
criminatory practices from judicial review.86
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals, holding that "respondents' claims of discriminatory un-
dercompensation are not barred by § 703(h) [Bennett
Amendment] of Title VII merely because respondents do not per-
form work equal to that of male jail guards."87 This decision con-
sisted of an analysis of language, legislative histories, and the
remedial purposes of title VII and the EPA. The Court found no
clear congressional mandate to deprive victims of discrimination
of a remedy under title VII.88 On the other hand, "Congress
surely did not intend the Bennett Amendment to insulate ...
blatantly discriminatory practices from judicial redress under Ti-
tle VII."89
The Court heard the argument that "the pay structures of virtu-
ally every employer and the entire economy... [would be] at
risk and subject to scrutiny by the federal courts."9o The merits
of this argument, however, were found inapplicable here because
the County, not the courts, had already evaluated the worth of the
jobs in question; thus a court need not make its own assessment
of the value of jobs or impact of discrimination.91 The entire im-
pact of the Court's decision on future comparable worth claims
was avoided because of a vague distinction that "friespondents'
claim is not based on the controversial concept of 'comparable
worth,' ... [but] [r]ather, respondents seek to prove, by direct
evidence, that their wages were depressed because of intentional
sex discrimination .. "92 Liability for sex-based wage discrimi-
nation was established by Gunther, but the Court evaded a gen-
eral discussion of comparable worth claims because the remedy
was clearly available without judicial involvement. Nevertheless,
addition to guarding the prisoners, and the district court distinguished the rigors
of guarding female or male prisoners. The district court followed the judicial pre-
cedent of restricting title VII compensation claims to the EPA standards. See
Diehl, Civil Rights: Relationship of Title VII & the Equal Pay Act-New Muscle for
the Struggle Against Sex Discrimination, 19 WASHBURN W4. 554, 560-64 (1980);
Note, The Bennett Amendment-Title VII and Gender Based Discrimination, 68
GEO. L.J. 1172 (1980).
86. Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303, 1313 (9th Cir. 1980).
87. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.SJL.W. 4623, 4629 (1981).
88. Id. at 4628.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 4628-29.
92. Id. at 4624-25. This case is deficient in the area of comparable worth the-
ory, because no guidance is given to what theory under title VII is acceptable. The
introduction of an "intent" requirement for proving a title VII violation is a dan-
gerous limitation as discussed in notes 105-15 infra and accompanying text.
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it should only be a matter of time before an individual's claim can
prove liability without offering a simple remedy to the Court.
Meanwhile, successful cases seem to present circumstances
where computation of fair wages is not a judicial problem. In In-
ternational U. of Elec. (IUE) v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,93
plaintiffs' argument strongly emphasized the openly discrimina-
tory purpose behind the company's compensation practices and
depicted the remedial job evaluation process as a secondary and
manageable matter for the court.94 Although the claim was not
expressly characterized as "comparable worth," the allegation of
a discriminatory plan for compensation raised a comparable
worth issue.
The Westinghouse plant opened in 1917; and prior to 1965, all of
the jobs at the plant were segregated as to sex.95 In the late
1930's, Westinghouse adopted a job evaluation procedure for es-
tablishing a rate structure. The first two steps involved calculat-
ing the inherent value of each job, regardless of the employee's
sex. A labor grade was assigned to each job. Then the company's
Industrial Relations Manual instructed plant officials to compen-
sate women's jobs at a lower wage than men's jobs which had re-
ceived the same point rating.96 In 1965, the separate wage scales
93. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980). "Plaintiffs are not proceeding under the com-
parable [work] theory rejected by the Congress in 1963 .... [NCRA] liability on
an employer is wholly apart from any question of purpose or intent" Reply Brief
for Appellant, (IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980)) at 1.
94. Reply Brief for Appellant at 25 n.21.
95. The court adopted the plaintiffs' version of the facts. IUE v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d at 1097 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980).
There were "male" jobs and "female" jobs, but no jobs in which both
men and women worked. The female jobs were assembly line jobs, "sub-
assembly" jobs ... and "quality control" jobs .... The male jobs in-
cluded various material handling jobs... janitor, forklift operator, ware-
houseman, machine attendant and craft jobs. The substantial majority of
the employees in the plant have always been women.
Brief for the Appellant, (TUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.
1980)) at 5.
96: The Manual stated:
WAGE RATES FOR WOMEN
The gradient of the women's wage curve ... is not the same for women
as for men because of the more transient character of the service of the
former, the relative shortness of their activity in industry, the differences
in environment required, the extra services that must be provided, over-
time limitations, extra help needed for the occasional heavy work, and the
general sociological factors not requiring discussion herein.
The rate or range for Labor Grades do not coincide with the values on
the men's scale. Basically then, we have another wage curve or Key Sheetfor women below and not parallel with the men's curve.
by sex were united into one scale with no sexual designation.
The women's jobs labor grades were generally placed below those
of the male jobs that had been at the same labor grade level
before the merger. Subsequently, the male-female rate dispari-
ties were maintained or enlarged, and women remained clustered
in their traditional lower-paying jobs through the company's job
placement.97
The comparable worth issue is central in UE as the court ex-
plained: 'The problem here is that Westinghouse allegedly used
a system which set the wage rates lower for any classification if
the group covered within that category was predominantly fe-
male."98 The burden upon the court to compare jobs' worth was
not heavy since the existing job grade levels set by Westinghouse
made the comparison relatively simple.9 9 In these circumstances,
the court analyzed the problem primarily in terms of the statu-
tory violation, and a practical concern with the economic outcome
of the decision was not evident in the determination of a title VII
violation.
Liability for a claim of sex-based wage discrimination under ti-
tle VII has been established by the Supreme Court in Gunther,
which held that a claim is not barred merely because claimants
do not perform work equal to that of an employee of the opposite
sex.100 No guidelines, however, were provided in Gunther for the
theory and scope of such a cause of action under title VII. Prior
to Gunther, those courts which approved claims involving a com-
parable worth remedy under title VII tended to emphasize statu-
tory construction of language, legislative history, and the
underlying policy prohibiting sex-based discrimination consistent
with other forms of discrimination. Those courts which denied
comparable worth claims under title VII were primarily con-
cerned with the economy, difficulty, and costs of change to non-
discriminatory practices. While the earlier courts reflected a re-
fusal to go beyond an equal work standard for any compensation-
type claims, recent courts have demonstrated a willingness to find
a remedy for a discriminatory injury rather than immunize cer-
tain discriminatory acts from liability.
Brief for Appellant at 7 (Emphasis added).
97. Id. at 9-11.
98. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (3d Cir. 1980). The
court appropriately described the problem as use of a system which discriminated.
Evidence of intent is rare, and Congress emphasized the consequences of employ-
ment discrimination under title VII. See notes 105-15 and accompanying text
infra.
99. Yet the unique facts surrounding this case and the lack of comparable
worth language in the claim make the future application of this decision uncertain.
100. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4629 (1981).
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ESTABLISHING A COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIM
Stating a Cause of Action
No court has yet suggested a comprehensive theory for stating
a comparable worth cause of action. Until a theory develops, no-
tice to the employer of the action will probably utilize title VII's
language. Title VII states that,
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation...
because of such individual's ... sex... ; or (2) to limit, segregate, or clas-
sify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
... adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's ... sex .... 101
A cause of action alleging an injury from the consequences of a
discriminatory practice should be sufficient in those courts which
base the validity of the cause of action upon an examination of
the relationship and meaning of title VII, EPA, and the Bennett
Amendment. 02
Burden of Proof
The survival of a valid comparable worth clairn, under judicial
review depends upon the burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff.
Generally in a title VII case, the plaintiff must prove an adverse
or disparate impact on wages because of discriminatory practices,
which then shifts the burden to the employer to justify the behav-
ior.1 03 If a court imposes on the plaintiff the additional burden of
proving an employer's subjective intent to discriminate, establish-
ing a prima facie case becomes virtually impossible except in rare
circumstances where there is extraordinary evidence of discrimi-
nation. 0 4 Resolving what constitutes a prima facie case is critical
for the future of comparable worth litigation.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
102. As noted by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), the language of title VII places primary emphasis upon the consequences
of an'employer's practice. For a proposed action based on sex segregation and
wage discrimination, see Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 475-87.
103. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs holding was re-
affirmed in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). But a large exception to
disparate impact has been created for seniority systems that perpetrate the effects
of past discrimination. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
104. See notes 95-99 and accompanying text infra. The unique facts of IUE v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), permitted a demonstration
of past discriminatory intent.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,105 the Supreme Court considered
the burden of proof for a prima facie case under title VII and held
that facially neutral employment policies which disparately affect
a protected class constitute unlawful discrimination. The absence
of intent to discriminate is irrelevant; "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
... that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to job capacity."106 A disparate impact analysis of a
comparable worth prima facie case would require that the wage
differential between a female's and male's compensation exists
because of sex discrimination and not a factor other than sex.10 7
This analysis becomes important when blatant, discriminatory
policies are abandoned in favor of subtle forms of discrimination.
If a prima facie case must demonstrate a discriminatory intent
or purpose, subtle discriminatory acts will be impossible to prove.
Comparable worth proponents have feared that recent decisions
of the Supreme Court requiring proof of intent in equal protection
cases would be applied to Title VII issues of proof.108 Certain lan-
guage in Gunther might reinforce these fears, because the respon-
dents sought to prove intentional discrimination, 109 and the Court
was content to limit its decision to that question of intent. The
dissenting opinion stated: "[a]ll we may conclude is that even ab-
sent a showing of equal work, there is a cause of action under
Title VII where there is direct evidence that an employer has in-
tentionally depressed a woman's salary because she is a wo-
man."110 The dissent's conclusion does not account for the
majority opinion's quote of Griggs, that title VII proscribes "not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation."1 11 A reasonable conclusion is
that the Court has not directly addressed the question of whether
intent is required in all title VII compensation claims.
The Court has two reasons to make a distinction between the
title VII standard of proof and the constitutional issue of equal
protection. First, in Washington v. Davis,112 the Court itself dis-
tinguished a constitutional claim from a claim under title VII by
105. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
106. Id at 432.
107. See "statutory exemptions" notes 129-35 and accompanying text infra.
108. Recent cases include: Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Personnel
Adm. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See
Berger, Litigation on Behalf of Women, Lib. of Cong. Cat. No. 80-66052 35 (1980).
109. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4624 (1981).
110. Id. at 4635.
111. Id. at 4626.
112. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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noting that a title VII claim deserved Court deference to the con-
gressional emphasis upon discriminatory consequences." 3 This
deference has not lost its basis in sound reasoning over recent
years. Requiring discriminatory intent in a title VII case would
debilitate the congressional prohibition of discriminatory
consequences." 4
Second, the language of the statutory defenses indicates that
the employer may justify a wage differential with one of several
lawful exceptions to discriminatory practices.n15 Congress pro-
vided exceptional, lawful practices as protection for the employer,
in the face of a proven wage differential. If Congress intended to
require proof of intent, the wage differential would have little sig-
nificance by itself, and Congress would have allowed any reason-
able, good faith defense to a claim of invidious purpose. A review
of the statutory provisions supports the conclusion that proof of a
discriminatory intent was not required by Congress.
The burden of proof is heavy enough without imposing an in-
tent requirement. This burden was practically met in successful
wage discrimination cases by a variety of strategies. One strategy
was to demonstrate employer practices which were openly dis-
criminatory at some point in history.116 Also successful were
strategies which focused on one woman's struggle against open
discriminationl 1 or an on-going plan which furthered a once
openly discriminatory practice.n18 Finally, some courts have
shown sensitivity to the seriousness of wage discrimination when
the alternative to a remedy was insulation from review119 or per-
mitting the same behavior prohibited on the basis of race, reli-
gion, or national origin.120
113. Id. at 239, 246-47.
114. In Gilbert v. General Elec., 419 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court utilized equal
protection standards in deciding a title VII action. "Since the intermediate scru-
tiny standard adopted for claims of unconstitutional sex discrimination legitimizes
some sex-based discrimination,. . . incorporation of those standards into title VII
would dilute the definition of discrimination that the courts had evolved." Berger,
Litigation on Behal of Women, Lib. of Cong. Cat. No. 80-66052 31 (1980).
115. See "statutory exemptions" notes 129-35 and accompanying text infra.
116. UE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980).
117. Cf. Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980) (showed a
history of being denied equal pay to a predecessor, denial of opportunity and re-
taliation for filing a complaint).
118. IME v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980) (demon-
strated a past discriminatory plan which was perpetuated).
119. Id.; Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980).
120. UE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980).
Specific evidence that a gross injustice is occurring and that
something must be done about it is a strong form of persuasion in
a comparable worth situation. Without the open history, a spe-
cific account of an individual, or a high degree of seriousness, the
plaintiff must rely on statistics and expert witnesses to under-
score the importance of the case's theory.
Ample statistics are available to demonstrate historical and
contemporary job segregation by sex,121 the major employment of
women in the workforce,122 and women's career and financial re-
sponsibilities related to employment.123 These statistics cannot
directly prove or disprove an employer's discriminatory practices;
but showing pervasive statistical disparities in positions between
females and males, bolstered by testimony of specific instances of
discrimination, might support a claim of a systemwide pattern or
practice of employment discrimination.124
In particular, estimates of wage differentials by sex, derived
from multiple regression analysis, are used in matters of proof. A
statistician estimates what earnings would have been if employ-
ees were identical in every respect measured except sex. Control-
ling factors vary, such as race, age, education, experience,
seniority, earnings, parental income, geographical regions, labor
market conditions, geographic mobility, seasonal employment,
marital status, absenteeism, etc. 25 The studies themselves are
not readily available, 2 6 but the results are often well-publicized
in terms of percentage (i.e., women earn only 58% of wages
earned by men).127
Defenses
Title VII contains exemptions which protect the interests of
121. '.g., WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMP'LOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 1 (1975); U.S.
COIMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND
WOMEN139-46 (1978).
122. E.g., WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN WORKERS TODAY 1 (1976).
123. E.g., WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES
OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979); WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, FACTS
ABOUT WOMEN HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND HEADS OF FAMILIES (1973).
124. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(disparate impact without intent or disparate treatment with purpose).
125. Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 456; Nelson, supra note 13, at 251.
126. See Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 455-56, n.220 (citing OAXACA, THEORY &
MEASUREMENT IN THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDus-
TRIAL RELATIONS 26 (1977)). Table 1 on estimates of wage differentials by sex and
race lists 8 studies, some of which are unpublished.
127. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN
WOMEN AND MEN 19 (1979).
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those charged with discrimination.128 If a discriminatory practice
is not exempt, an employer may argue that "reality," based upon
a classical economic theory, undermines the sex-based wage dis-
crimination allegations. Finally, an employer may decide that the
best defense is an offense, in the form of reasons why the court
should permit discriminatory practices to continue.
Statutory exemptions
Section 703(a) of title VII permits classification on the basis of
sex, religion or national origin (but not race) where sex, religion
or national origin are bona fide occupational qualifications.129
Section 703(h) provides that it shall not be unlawful for an em-
ployer to use seniority, merit or testing systems in order "to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions
or privileges of employment," provided that such a system is not
designed or used to discriminate.130
The Bennett Amendment serves to incorporate the EPA excep-
tions into title VII for claims of unlawful wage differentials.131
These exceptions are similar to title VII's exemptions, with one
important addition. "No employer.., shall discriminate,... ex-
cept where such payment is made pursuant to ... (iv) a differen-
tial based on any factor other than sex."132
The Supreme Court in Gunther noted that "incorporation of the
fourth affirmative defense could have significant consequences for
title VII litigation.' 33 Whereas the title VII prohibition extends
to subtle discrimination in operation, the EPA exception was
designed to limit employer liability and to prevent courts and ad-
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See 6 G. COOPER & H. RABB, EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT LAW AND IGATION 33-36 (1971).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). The bona fide occupational qualification has been
the chief substantive defense to facial sex discrimination but has not been applied
to wage levels or structure issues.
130. Id. The significance of this section was limited by Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
131. See notes 45-59 and accompanying text supra.
132. It is not unlawful for an employer to use (i) a seniority system, (ii) a
merit system, (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or qual-
ity of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex: Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage rate differen-
tial in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1976). See Note, The Bennett Amendment-Title VII and
Gender-Based Discrimination, 68 GEO. L.J. 1169-90 (1980).
133. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4626 (1981).
ministrative agencies from judging practices causing disparate
impact, as long as the practices were not based on sex.134 This
problem remains unresolved, for the Court declined to decide
"how sex-based wage discrimination litigation under Title VII
should be structured to accommodate the fourth affirmative de-
fense of the Equal Pay Act. .... ,"135
Many legitimate factors can cause a wage differential, sex being
the only unlawful factor. The employer may be able to demon-
strate that adjustment for a legitimate factor would eliminate the
wage differential originally attributed to sex or that a legitimate
factor may cause the same effect upon the wages of an analogous
group of workers who are not segregated by sex. The regrettable
problem in this unresolved area is that no one yet knows whether
this defense will swallow up the liability or will become ineffec-
tive in operation.
Labor market competition arguments
Employers have attempted unsuccessfully to argue that they
should pay women less than men because of the market rate.136
But some courts have taken judicial notice of "economic realities"
involving the market rate and stressed practical considerations in
determining wages.137 Two common defensive rationales for a
sex-based wage differential are that women workers' rates of pay
are (1) determined by what other employers pay women workers
in the community or (2) a reflection of the jobs' values based on a
classicial competition theory of the labor market involving supply
and demand.
First, the determination of wages by large employers is more
complicated than a simple referral to other employer practices. A
worker's rate is composed of two elements.138 One element is the
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Hodgson v. Brookha-
ven General Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970). This argument is distinct from
the remedial problem facing a court which is concerned about affecting the market
rate. See Lemons v. City of Denver, 17 F.E.P. Cases 906 (D. Col. 1978), aff'd, 620
F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563
F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). Concern over impact on the marketplace is not shared by
all comparable worth opponents. "If the 'comparable worth' theory is widely
adopted, eventually the discrepancy between marketplace wages and wages devel-
oped in accordance with an unbiased rating system should be sharply reduced, if
not eliminated. The short-term impact of comparable worth, however, presents
rather complex questions of statutory construction and public policy." Kahn,
supra note 13, at 141 n.17.
137. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Lemons v. City of
Denver, 17 F.E.P. Cases 906 (D. Col. 1978), affd, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980).
138. N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 295 (1971).
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average wage "level" of the company in comparison with other
companies in the same industry or the same community. The
other element is the wage "structure" within a company; jobs are
sorted out and assigned specific wage rates in relation to each
other. The combination of these two elements leads to wage dif-
ferentials within the firm and between firms.139 In any local labor
market, some firms are known as high-paying and others as low-
paying, and the wage spread between firms for the same work
may be considerable.140
While no wage is determined with complete disregard for exter-
nal market forces, the company's wage structure usually demands
higher priority for the maintenance of an internal hierarchy of
wages per job worth and status.14' The intrafirm wage structure
is principally based on the functional worth of one job relative to
another. 42 In an unusual situation, this structured wage may
give way to a higher wage in order to compete with other firms for
a highly desirable employee.143 But in that circumstance, the ex-
ternal market rate for the desirable employee requires a higher
minimum wage offer than the firm had evaluated originally for the
job. The reverse argument that a low community market rate for
female workers should lower the wages paid to females fails to be
a "business necessity" and constitutes exploitation of one sex's
classification in the market.44
Given the many factors involved in wage determination, the
market rate is significant as a mirror of the practices and needs of
large employers in the community. Reliance, then, on the market
rate as a justification for reducing female workers' wages lacks
substance as defense and promotes circular reasoning contrary to
the statutory mandate of title VII.
Second, arguments are made that female wages reflect what
their labor is worth, determined by the classical theory of supply
139. Id. at 387, 391.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 322. "[T]he necessity to maintain some relationship within Ja com-
pany's] own wage-ratio structure transcends any pressure to maintain a relation-
ship with the labor market as a whole for the particular grade of labor." Id. at 392.
142. Id. at 296.
143. Id.
144. "Business necessity" is the major defense for neutral policies which alleg-
edly cause a disparate impact. See B. BABcocK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S.
Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 331-43 (1975).
and demand in a free society.145 A premise of the classical theory
is a perfectly competitive labor market which assumes the follow-
ing factors to be true on the supply-side of the market: "workers
have full and perfect knowledge of the market, including informa-
tion on opportunities available and wage rates;.., labor is not or-
ganized; and each laborer makes [her] own decisions on
accepting jobs and wages."' 46 On the demand-side of the market,
some of the necessary conditions would be: "each employer rep-
resents a small enough share of the total demand for labor that
his decision will not influence the market as a whole; ... [and]
employers act individually, and not in concert, in determining
their wage and employment levels."147
The classic competitive system ignores unions and large compa-
nies which can control the supply of labor and set the wages.
While supply and demand creates a theoretical "system," in fact
the theory has not worked for predicting results with sub-groups
of "secondary workers" (including women).148 Assumptions
about workers are required for the theory to "work" and reflect
preferences of the theoreticians about labor participation.149
When women workers in low-paying jobs are uninformed about
wage rates and depicted as temporarily working for pin money, or
when mobility is hampered by economic responsibility for others,
or when female-dominated jobs are unrepresented by unions and
informally devalued by large employers, the individual woman is
not in an equal position to bargain. Business, government, and
other organizations in this country have a high demand for cer-
145. See Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 446; F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS,
JR., LABOR ECONOMICS (1980); N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR
(1971).
146. F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS, JR., LABOR ECONOMICS 177 (1980).
147. Id. at 178.
148. N. CHAMiBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 346 (1971).
In many small towns and rural areas, for instance, a wife may be lucky to
hold down any job, and the notion of prospecting for a better job is rather
fanciful. In such situations, it can even be said that a firm which employs
primarily women can in effect create its own labor supply by moving into
the area .... If a firm leaves such an area, just the reverse may occur as
previously employed ives withdraw from the labor force.
Id. at 351.
149. Clearly, these assumptions reflect the theory of a free individual in an
equal bargaining position with an employer in a free society, where other employ-
ment opportunities exist if the "bargain" is unsatisfactory to the potential em-
ployee. The pure competition theory is the basis for attacking comparable worth.
A free society where no one is a slave and everyone bargains "equally" with em-
ployers has been asserted. See &. LIVERNASH, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES & Ar
TERNATIVES 85 (1980). Yet, "we can hardly conceive of 75 million different rates
flying off in all directions, each one pursuing its independent course without refer-
ence to any other rate that workers in the labor force are receiving." N. CHAMBER-
LAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 339 (1971).
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tain work positions filled mostly by females, such as secretaries,
clerks, nurses, certain factory workers, and domestic/service
workers. The possibility of controlling this female labor supply
should not be relegated to historical acts of discrimination when
subtle control is within the ability of multinational corporations
and large employer "wage-setters."
Critics of the competition theory also point out other weak-
nesses in the theory, such as the importance of social status in
setting wages,150 the wage differentials that exist both intra- and
inter-firm,' 5 ' the employer's "taste for discrimination" which lim-
its the employee's bargaining position,152 and outright prejudice
which operates especially when the employer believes he has the
legal right to discriminate. 5 3 The labor market competition the-
ory as a system to justify wages has failed to account for many
factual results in the United States economy.154
Theories justifying sex-based wage differentials
The labor market competition theory implicitly assigns fault to
the individual woman worker who bargained poorly and found
herself underpaid. In contrast, other theories focus on either sup-
ply or demand influences to explain why there should be a sex-
based wage differential.
On the supply-side, a human capital theorist might argue that
most women wish to be wives and mothers full-time and to be de-
voted for years to home and child care. 55 After working briefly to
'"pad the nest," the typical woman is expected to retire to home
and participate minimally if at all in the labor force. Even if she
returns later, this intermittent pattern of labor force activity
reduces the rate of return to human capital investment. Women
150. N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 346 (1971).
151. Status relationships of deference and obligation are present in economic
organizations, and upper rungs on the organization chart represent superior posi-
tions. "In most economic pursuits, women are regarded as inferior to men," and
this status consideration can operate in the determination of wages. Id. at 385-87.
152. Id. at 365; F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS, JR., LABOR EcONOMICS 507
(1980).
153. N. CHA uIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 394 (1971).
154. "[Ejmployers often have worker preferences and will pay more or less de-
pending on the kind of workers that satisfies them. Often these preferences are in
the nature of prejudices (of race. . ., sex... ) without necessary relation to work
ability." N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 371 (1971).
155. F. MARSHALJ, A. KING & V. BiGOS, JR., LABOR ECONOMICS 171-81 (1980); N.
CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 343-74 (1971).
would predictably train less for work, lose their skills in retire-
ment, and be attracted to jobs requiring little training. 5 6
This theory does not conform to real-life facts. Women do not
all marry or have children, do not necessarily stop work upon
bearing a child, and do not begin work with less training than
their male counterpart who is offered more money.157 Women
earn less than men at the start of their careers and the gap
widens as the men and women age, even as work experience and
training level increase.1 5 8 Finally, the fact that some women
"drop out" of the labor force to care for their children could also
be explained by labor market discrimination. Discouraging dead-
end work lowers the cost of nonparticipation.159
On the demand-side, employers might depict all women as poor
risks for employment. Higher quitting rates than men and short
career spans seem to support statistical discrimination. 60 This
theory suggests that employers treat each woman as a member of
this high risk, statistical group, including career-minded women
with separate attributes. Excluding women from training ladders
and the best-paying jobs for this theoretical reason is greatly un-
fair to many individuals; women workers are employed an aver-
age twenty-three years in the labor force.161 Quitting and low
expectations are reinforced by this treatment.
Finally, the existing wage differentials are justified by outra-
geous cost estimates to change employment practices. The actual
correction of wage inequities is negotiable by degree and makes
the estimates of cost vary greatly. In addition, alarming cost esti-
mates can be produced by incorporating costs for a massive regu-
156. F. MARSHALL, A. KiNG & V. BRINGS, JR., LABOR ECONOMICS 509-11 (1980).
157. Id.
158. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPr. OF LABOR, WOMEN WORKERS TODAY
(1976).
159. F. MARsHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS, JR., LABOR ECONOMICS 511 (1980). The
theory as a set of principles continues to have limited value, for instance, as only
one factor in the wage-setting process.
160. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN
WOMEN AND MEN 5-6 (1979). The theory of statistical discrimination is that most
employers will perceive a woman as a member of a high-risk group (higher overall
quitting rate than men) in considering an employee for specific training. Employ-
ers will be unwilling to acquire costly information to distinguish one woman from
another and consequently, women in general, including the career-minded, are
excluded from training ladders and advancement in pay. See, e.g., F. MARSHALL., A.
KING & V. BRIGGS, JR., LABOR ECONOMICS 262-91, 511 (1980).
161. "The average worklife expectancy of women has increased by more than
one-half over the two decades since 1950. In 1970 the average woman could expect
to spend 22.9 years of her life in the work force." WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, 20 FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS 1 (1979) (sources for statistics: U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census; U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare,
National Center for Social Statistics; U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics and Employment and Training Administration).
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latory bureaucracy (which is not proposed by anyone except
comparable worth opponents).162
No cost analysis is complete until the benefit has also been ana-
lyzed. The producers of work who would receive higher wages
are also the consumers who would spend that money in the econ-
omy. Those workers would no longer be discriminated against be-
cause of their sex; and instead of discouragement, higher
productivity would be a reasonable result. The integration of "fe-
male" work into a bias-free wage structure would boost morale
and incentive to invest in the organization's growth and future.
COMPARABLE WORTH REMEDIES
Once a wage violation of title VII is found, attention turns to the
determination of fair wages. At this point, several arguments
might arise in an attempt to defeat the remedial comparison of
pay and job values. These opposing arguments are eclectic; they
question the court's remedial power, express alarm at govern-
ment regulation, insist that the best remedy is employment trans-
fer, or stress the unreasonableness of the remedial burden upon
the court or society. In the early stage of developing comparable
worth remedies, all parties should take responsibility for develop-
ing fair methods of correcting wage inequity and be prepared to
assist the court in its consideration of remedial options.
Courts have broad remedial power under title VII and "may en-
join the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and other such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
162. E.g., "[T]o raise the aggregate pay of the country's 27.3 million full-time
working women high enough so that the median pay for women would equal that
of men would add a staggering $150 billion a year to civilian payrolls." Smith, The
EEOC's Bold Foray Into Job Evaluation, FORTUNE 58-59 (Sept. 11, 1978).
Scenarios of disaster have not been included in this discussion of cost. In Nel-
son, supra note 13, at 291-94, the following predictions threaten women's participa-
tion in the work force: rather than correct wage inequities, companies will
eliminate women's jobs through automation; the law will be ingeniously avoided,
analogous to IRS regulation manipulation; women's jobs will be exported to over-
sea competition, i.e., where garment workers make 30 cents per hour; illegal aliens
will be imported to work for menial sums; and inflation will increase, affecting in-
vestments and savings poorly (although this is the least concern for low-paid wo-
men workers).
These threats are shocking because they are intended to discourage the con-
gressional intent of title VII and frighten judges into submission. They indicate
the seriousness of comparable worth opponents, implying the law is no restraint.
of employees, with or without pay..., or any other equitable re-
lief as the court deems appropriate ... "1 63 The remedial goal is
to "make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlaw-
ful employment discrimination."164
Title VII remedies for non-wage violations have caused major
changes in business and institutional practices.165 Opponents to
comparable worth claims suggest that a title VII remedy for sex-
based wage discrimination will usher in a Big Brother state of
government control.166 While major changes of some employers'
methods are possible, the idea of a new government bureaucracy
to regulate wages has no basis in comparable worth theory per se
or in the statutory language of title VII. First, the law is a prohibi-
tion of illegal discriminatory practices and does not impose a fed-
eral system of wages. Affirmative action by the court must be
appropriate to each case's particular facts, and the court has equi-
table alternatives to consider according to the circumstances. 67
For instance, the employers, not the courts, performed evalua-
tions of job worth in both Gunther and IUE.168 Second, relief is
available now for wage discrimination based on race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin; the arguments apply only to denial on a
sex-basis. Therefore, the speculative prediction of a unitary sys-
tem of wage control serves primarily to alarm the court and en-
courage retreat.
Another argument to defeat a comparable worth remedy is that
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). For a comprehensive review of title VII remedies,
see Reinstein, Remedies in Title VII Cases, in FEDERAL CIvIL R IGHTS LrrIGATION
345.404 (1977).
164. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court held that an
individual who suffered illegal discrimination is presumptively entitled to an
award of back pay. Also, back pay could be awarded to class members who did
not personally fie a charge. Id. at 418.
165. It has upset recruitment procedures which were time-honored, such as
Iword of mouth' recruiting; it has struck down employment selection pro-
cedures such as pre-employment tests which were viewed as essential to
the operation of industry; it has required changes in seniority systems
which were the fruit of national policy favoring the collective bargaining
process; and it has required psychological adjustments by millions of
workers and thousands of employers who have had to abandon the appli-
cation of their beliefs concerning the place of minorities and women. It
has worked a major revision in our industrial relations systems. Further-
more, this heavy impact on traditional ways of doing business was known
to the Congress which in 1972 expanded Title VII and strengthened the
EEOC. Thus, the suggestion that Title VII was not intended to interfere
with the operation of the wage setting process is without foundation.
Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 468-69.
166. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
167. Under title VII, the court may take "such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
168. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.W. 4623, 4628-29 (1981); IUE v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (3d Cir. 1980).
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women workers always have the opportunity to transfer from a
low to a higher paying job.169 To support this theory, title VII is
characterized as a strictly limited prohibition against denial of
employment opportunity.170 This argument ignores large portions
of the statutory prohibition concerning discriminatory practices in
compensation or practices which adversely affect the status of the
employee based on sex.17' Also, the possibility for a worker to
transfer jobs does not always exist.
Consider a hypothetical town with two or three principal em-
ployers. The female secretaries in town were underpaid solely
because of their sex, and they won a class action suit under title
VII. A remedy requiring their transfer into different and better
paying jobs in the next town would involve factors of re-training,
mobility, and actual job opportunities in a bad economy. This
"opportunity" remedy would be no remedy at all. As an argu-
ment against any comparable worth remedy, it serves as an eva-
sion of responsibility.
The responsibility for correcting wage inequities can be im-
posed by the courts or assumed by an employer in several alter-
native forms. First, the employer could be ordered to prepare and
submit a compensation system that does not take sex into ac-
count. 7 2 Proceedings would be limited to litigation of objections
to the plan. The plan may include back pay, a common remedy in
title VII cases, and relief from on-going discriminatory prac-
tices.173 Positions could be upgraded according to their relative
functional value or restructured in accord with a non-discrimina-
tory plan.
Second, if the employer refuses to develop an intrafirm wage
169. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Kahn, supra note 13,
at 140. This argument assumes that title VII is limited in scope, analogous to Exec.
Order 11478: "It has long been the policy of the United States Government to pro-
vide equal opportunity in Federal employment on the basis of merit and fitness
and without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
3 C.F.R. § 207 (1974).
170. See note 169 supra.
171. See note 8 supra.
172. A general principle for affirmative relief under title VII is that the remedy
must "so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as
for like discrimination in the future." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
415 (1975). See Grubb, Title VII Remedies in FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LTGATION 295,
306-08, 314-16 (1977).
173. See Grubb, Title VII Remedies in FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 295,
306-08, 314-16 (1977).
structure system or refuses to adjust a defective system, each job
in question could be examined in detail; and remedial proceed-
ings could be handled by a Special Master.17 4 A variety of evalua-
tion systems have been and are being devised to classify jobs by
their functional value, and the general approach taken is either
job ranking or factor comparison. 7 5 The theories, applications,
experts, and general experience with job evaluation are at the dis-
posal of the courts.17 6
Third, a simpler alt3rnative would be for the parties to agree on
an appropriate remedy.? The woman worker might be able to
bargain with her recalcitrant employer if the employer is in viola-
tion of title VII and appreciates the benefit of a bargain. Integra-
tion of sex-segregated jobs may also be agreed upon, and the
employer might decide to re-structure the jobs themselves to in-
crease incentive among both male and female employees.
CONCLUSION
The correction of most unlawful, sex-based wage inequities re-
quires some type of comparable worth remedy. Under title VII,
Congress intended to include these compensation claims which
do not come under the Equal Pay Act. Title VII's prohibitory and
remedial powers are broad enough to support comparable worth
claims. Circuit courts have split, however, over recognizing a
comparable worth claim, and judicial decision-making has re-
flected a tension between the scope of title VII rights and poten-
tial economic impact of a remedy. In Gunther, liability under title
VII for a non-EPA claim of wage discrimination has been estab-
174. Id. Equal pay cases under EPA sometimes require job evaluators, and the
same process could occur in comparing job criteria in comparable worth cases.
Complex title VII cases are regularly bifurcated. See United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817
(1976).
175. The impetus to rationalize a firm's wage structure (by each job's value)
has come largely from union demands for the adjustment of wage inequities. See
N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 298 (1971).
The EEOC has commissioned a major study by the National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS) on the feasibility of bias-free job evaluation systems. See County of
Wash. v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4624-25 n.6 (1981) (noting D. TREIMAN, JOB
EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW (1979) (interim report)). The development of
an unbiased method is important to serve as a model option to those who have
found no solutions of their own.
176. Ideally, the development of a model, bias-free job evaluation system would
be invaluable as an option for companies needing to correct their inter-firm wage
structure. The involvement of top management and the development of the new
system(s) is assured, however, only if the law's prohibitions are enforced. With-
out enforcement, no serious investment by business and government can be ex-
pected to result.
177. See Grubb, Title VII Remedies in FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITGATION 333-39
(1977) (settlement via consent decree).
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lished, but theory, proof, defenses, and remedies remain un-
resolved.
Resolution of the comparable worth controversy involves judi-
cial enforcement of statutory mandates and remedial develop-
ments of bias-free evaluation systems, wage negotiation, and
possible restructuring of work positions by employers. Compara-
ble worth remedies for wage inequities will be developed when
unlawful sex-based wage discrimination is no longer tolerable.
The alternative is to insulate discriminatory wage practices from
review and perpetuate unjust wage exploitation of a large class of
employees.
KJ. HEADLEY

